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CHANGING POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARTHUR F. LYKKE, JR., USA

majority of the people are poor by the
standards of America or Western Europe.
Many of the leaders, intellectuals, and "white
collar" workers deplore their backwardness
and entertain hopes of growing wealth and
improved living conditions which often fail to
materialize.
President Nixon has brought into effect a
new policy aimed at reducing American
military involvement in the area. Most
American ground combat troops will have
been withdrawn from the Republic of
Vietnam. US forces are simultaneously being
reduced in other areas in the Far East. These
actions were precipitated by the American
people and Congress who became increasingly
disenchanted with US actions in Southeast
Asia. The United States has fought three wars
in the Pacific within one generation. Many
Americans feel that we have failed in the
latest Asian venture and cry "No more
Vietnams! "
At the same time, we see the resurgence of
Japan. Already an economic giant, Japan
shows signs of playing an increasing political
role and of feeling the frustrations produced
by major power status. With a burgeoning
overseas trade, Japan is aggressively seeking
new markets and additional raw materials to
feed its home island factories. The United
States has been engaged in an economic
struggle, primarily over balance of payments,
with this, its most important overseas trading
partner.
After decades of partially self-imposed
isolation, Mainland China is emerging on the
international scene. "Ping-pong" diplomacy
and President Nixon's trip to the People's
Republic of China (PRC) have caused great
excitement and high expectations. Peking,
formally seated in the United Nations, can be
expected to play a far more significant role in
international relations, especially as a possible

(Editor's Note: The Asian/Pacific area has
become a multipolar arena for four major
powers and a host o f smaller ones. With the
growth of pluralism and the dynamic
relationships between nations, the region will
remain a major source o f problems and
international tension. In this brief article, the
author attempts to show why the United
States must preserve a balancing presence in
Asia in order to maintain peace in the area,
emphasizing political and economic means
while maintaining a credible military
capability.)

The Asian/Pacific area is presently
undergoing changes that will have a profound
impact on international relations for decades
to come. Of the five great power centers in
the world-the United States, Japan, the
Soviet
Union,
China,
and Western
Europe-the first four perceive major interests
in the Pacific. The area as a whole contains a
large segment of the world's population. The
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better relations have begun between the
Republic of Korea and North Korea.
No longer can the situation be described in
terms of bipolarity. The Pacific has become a
multipolar arena for four major powers and a
host of smaller ones. The general setting and
major power relationships briefly introduced
here, point to the initial conclusion that the
Pacific/East Asian area is likely to remain a
major source of problems and international
tension in the remaining years of the
twentieth century.

leader for particular groups of Third World
states. The "spirit of Bandung," which quietly
expired after 1955, may be reincarnated in a
different form-this time within the United
Nations. China's delegate to the United
Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua, has made a bid for
Third World leadership by proclaiming that
"China is still an economically backward
country as well as a developing country. Like
the overwhelming majority of Asian, African
and Latin American countries, China belongs
to the Third World." He also declared that
"We are opposed to the power politics and
hegemony of big nations bullying small ones"
and vowed that China would never subject
others to "aggression, subversion, control,
interference or bullying."l China, after having
been rebuffed by many Arab, African, and
Latin American nations in previous relations,
is trying a different approach and acting in a
more sophisticated and diplomatic manner.
The Taiwan problem has not yet been solved.
Two hostile governments still face each other
across a hundred miles of water no longer
patrolled in strength by the US Seventh Fleet.
Lest we forget, the PRC has a growing nuclear
capability which can readily be used as a
psychological tool to enforce its stepped-up
diplomatic initiatives.
The Soviet Union, now on a nuclear par
with the United States, has shown a greater
interest in the Pacific. Soviet naval power has
increased in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Brezhnev's call for an Asian system of
collective security, although generally
dismissed by Asian nations, clearly signaled
Russia's intentions to strengthen her position
and to contain China. The possibility of
Soviet/Japanese cooperation in developing
Siberia may have a tremendous impact on the
future of Asia.
The end of US participation in ground
combat in Vietnam will not see the
conclusion of the Indochina War. There is
continuing unrest and aggression in Southeast
Asia. North Vietnam and the PRC are training
and supporting insurgents from throughout
Indochina, as well as from Malaysia, Thailand,
and Burma. Animosity and invectives threaten
another demilitarized zone-the 38th parallel
in Korea. However, exploratory talks aimed at

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

In the past, only three Asian/Pacific
nations have escaped total colonization by
Western powers-China, Japan, and Thailand.
Undeveloped Asian countries were no match
for the modernized West. Japan's victory over
the Russians in the war of 1905 was as
surprising to Asians as it was welcomed.
Spurred on by this victory, Japan's leaders
began to plan a Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere. Raw materials from
Southeast Asia would accelerate industrial
development at home. As a result, the Rising
Sun spread throughout the Pacific to the
shores of Australia and the borders of India.
At the conclusion of World War I I , the Asians
did not want the return of European colonial
power as a replacement for an equally disliked
Japanese hegemony. A rising tide of
nationalism contributed to wars of
independence in Vietnam and Indonesia. The
youthful Asian nations were forced to
struggle against a myriad of problems, in
addition to the critical one of security.
Leadership, while highly motivated, lacked
experience. It would take years to build an
effective governmental bureaucracy.
Economies were undeveloped. Transportation
was lacking. World War I I had caused
widespread destruction and had greatly
disrupted society in general.
It is important for us to understand the
general mood of post-World War I I America.
There was a real and persistent Soviet military
threat in Europe. Communists, commonly
supported by the USSR, led insurrections in
many parts of the world. In 1950 North
23

disgusted over the seemingly endless conflict.
Too many promises of victory around the
c o r n e r proved overly optimistic. An
undeclared war, fought without calling up the
reserves, without placing the nation on a
w a r t i m e footing, and without gaining
adequate public support, played a major part
in President Johnson's decision not to run for
reelection. Americans could not understand
why so much effort was being expended with
so few visible results in the jungles of
Southeast Asia 8,000 miles from the coast of
California. Concern was mounting over the
domestic ills of our society: the plight of our
cities; the rising rate of crime; the pollution of
our environment; the unrest of our students;
and above all, the increasing tension between
our races. The demand for a restructuring of
our national priorities made itself heard in the
Presidential Primaries of 1968. When
President Nixon was inaugurated the
following year, he recognized that he had
been given a mandate by the American people
to get out of Vietnam. "Vietnamization"
became the key word in our Asian policy.
Since the announcement of the Nixon
Doctrine at Guam, there has been much
conjecture, especially in the Pacific area. US
military forces are being reduced in many
countries in Asia. The containment policy has
been supplanted by one based on negotiation
with both the People's Republic of China and
the Soviet Union. There is increased Soviet
interest in the Pacific Area. Until very
recently Japan continued to maintain her
phenomenal growth rate while experiencing a
rise in nationalistic sentiments. What of the
future? What does it hold in store for the
major powers involved, and the smaller Asian
nations?

Korea, inspired by Stalin, attacked southward
and was later reinforced by the Mainland
Chinese who had chased Chiang Kai-shek's
Nationalists to Taiwan the previous year.
Communist insurgents were conducting
guerrilla wars in the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Burma. Official US policy did not condone
renewed colonization of Southeast Asia.
However, France returned to Indochina while
the United States was intimately concerned
with more vital interests in Western Europe
and Japan. In the midst of the Korean War, it
is understandable that we looked at the
F r e n c h o p e r a t i o n s in Indochina as
complementary to our own attempts to
contain Communist aggression. Our support
grew until we ultimately were paying for 80
percent of the French war effort. It also
seems reasonable that the United States
should attempt to resist the Communists in
Indochina after the French defeat at Dien
Bien Phu and the conclusion of the Geneva
Convention of 1954. The world was perceived
as a bipolar arena for a struggle between the
Free World and International Communism.
The American strategic policy in Asia was
aimed at the containment and isolation of
Communist China. A system of mutual
defense alliances and forward military bases
ringed both China and the USSR. As the
Soviet Union achieved parity in nuclear
weapons, a new strategy had to be formulated
to replace "massive retaliation." Nuclear
warfare was unthinkable-there could be no
winners, only losers. The Chinese Communists
came to rely on "wars of national liberation."
The Third World represented the countryside,
and would eventually encircle and defeat the
city nations of the modernized world. To
counteract this, the US strategy was switched
to one of "flexible response." The high
priority projects in the defense establishment
were those dealing with counterinsurgency
doctrine, and special forces trained to win the
hearts and minds of the people. One of the
objectives of our Vietnam endeavors was to
prove to the Communists that wars of
national liberation would not succeed.
As the Vietnam War continued, substantial
elements of the American people and of
Congress became frustrated and finally

UNITED STATES

America's leaders have often proclaimed
that "The United States is a Pacific Power,"
even now in the midst of a large scale military
retrenchment. During the last thirty years our
country has sent its soldiers to fight three
wars on the continent of Asia. Our Pacific
strategy was to contain communism and to
repel Communist aggression everywhere. But
24
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role in maintaining the balance of power in
the Pacific, to prevent any nation from
establishing a preponderant position. The
United States, Japan, China, and the USSR
will be the major powers in the area. Other
players are the smaller Asian states. This
arrangement will be dynamic and we must be
flexible. The policies of any one nation will
affect most or all of the others. We should
attempt to increase our trade within the
Pacific community. Finally, we should assist
t h e underdeveloped countries in their
attempts to modernize and improve the lot of
their peoples.
In 1969, President Nixon announced the
Nixon Doctrine. In essence, with respect to
our role in the international system, it means:
- that a major American role remains
indispensable.
- that other nations can and should
assume greater responsibilities, for their sake
as well as ours.
- that the change in the strategic
relationship calls for new doctrines.
- that the emerging polycentrism of the
Communist
world presents different
challenges and new opportunities.3 This
marks important revision in the forward
defense strategy as it concerns mainland Asia,
and the containment of Communist China.
" Vietnamization" h a s t u r n e d i n t o
"Asianization." Only a yet undetermined
residual US force will remain in Vietnam. In
South Korea we have reduced the authorized
American troop ceiling by 20,000 and have
expanded our military assistance for the
purpose of modernizing the Korean Armed
Forces. In February of 197 1 President Nixon
announced that the United States would
reduce its military presence by 12,000
personnel in Japan, 5,000 in Okinawa, 16,000
in Thailand, and 9,000 in the Philippines.4
The old Asian strategy was influenced by
Cold War considerations and the Domino
Theory. The Nixon Doctrine means self-help
for the Asians, with economic and technical
assistance from the United States, along with
a "nuclear shield" to protect smaller nations
from aggressive nuclear powers. This policy
calls for a reduced US military presence in
Asia.

now, times seem to have changed. It may be
surmised, in the opinion of this writer, from
our recent actions that today's goals are only
to withdraw our forces from Asia as rapidly as
possible, hoping that our prisoners of war will
be returned. Although we still claim to be a
Pacific power, the question can be asked,
"Are we acting like one?" This Nation may
now be turning her back on the Pacific in the
writer's opinion. Arguments are heard to
return our attentions to Europe where o u r
real national interests lie. Yet in the light of
recent events, the words written by President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 seem both
timely and pertinent. "I believe that our
future history will be more determined by our
position on the Pacific facing China, than by
our position on the Atlantic facing Europe."2
During the last third of this century we will
see great changes and a totally new power
relationship emerge in the Pacific. We must be
aware of them, examine them, and attempt to
formulate reasonable objectives.
In retrospect, our post-World War I I Asian
policy of containment of Red China and
prevention of aggression has been partially
successful. North Korea failed in its attempt
to expand southward. The 38th parallel still
marks the division of that separated nation.
South Korea has prospered, and its fighting
forces have improved greatly to the point
where they shoulder a significant amount of
the responsibility of the allied war effort in
Vietnam. While the United States provided a
security shield, all Asian nations gained
time-time to develop leaders and improve
their economies. Although the United States
was not directly involved, the Communists in
Indonesia were thwarted in their attempt to
take over from a faltering Sukarno. In 1965
Radio Peking announced that Thailand would
be the next target. Yet, Thailand has
prospered and increased its ability to defend
itself.
What are present US interests in the
Pacific? We can surely say that we want a
peaceful Pacific area, where all nations are
free to develop themselves and to trade with
each other. The goals that we establish to
protect our interests must be both rational
and achievable. First, we should play an active
26

President Nixon shown with Prime Minister Tanaka o f Japan during the Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.

The Nixon Doctrine apparently has not
been applied in quite the same way to
Europe. In his statement to C.L. Sulzberger of
The New York Times, President Nixon
declared, "Meanwhile, in Europe, we can't cut
down our forces until there is a mutual
agreement with the other side. We must stand
with our European friends if they will only do
a bit more themselves in NATO-as they have
indicated they will do."

economic, technological and financial power,
Japan has not yet assumed the mantle of
political, much less military, leadership. Will
that come next? If so, how soon, and in what
form?
Japan in the last five years has begun to
face problems that have been confronting
o t h e r industrialized modern states for
decades-such as the effects of rapid
urbanization, pollution, sharply rising labor
costs, and an ever expanding need for raw
materials. "Post-industrial society" type
problems will demand early solutions, or at
least approaches.
The United States has been Japan's
conqueror, mentor, protector, and now feels
the thrust of Japanese competition in its
domestic markets. Japan suffered two shocks
last year. Economically, the United States
imposed a tax on all foreign imports and
compelled reductions in Japanese textile
exports to the United States. Politically,

JAPAN

Within twenty-five years, Japan has
emerged as the third largest economy in the
world. This has been accomplished after a
crushing and humiliating defeat in World War
II. No longer is "Made in Japan" the butt of
jokes. Just the opposite, the branding is now a
credit to some of the world's finest
photographic, electronic and automotive
products. Although an Asian giant in terms of
27

the increasing Chinese threat, the special
vulnerability of Japan on its crowded island
base, and the American military retrenchment
in Asia. However, it can be argued that a
second-class nuclear deterrent is both wasteful
and useless. The vast sums of money required
may more wisely be expended on the
improvement of conventional forces. US
nuclear protection may not seem fully
credible forever, and Japan must defend
herself. It is likely that Japan will keep her
nuclear option open while continuing to
conduct research and development in the
nuclear and missile fields.
The Japanese have seen World War I I
militarism replaced by endorsement for
Article 9 of the Constitution which renounces
war as an instrument of policy, and in effect
gives up a measure of national sovereignty. It
is possible that a return to militarism could
take place if Japan's vital interests were
threatened.
O k i n a w a r e v e r t e d t o Japanese
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in May 1972. Japan
announced its intention of assuming gradually
the responsibility for the immediate defense
of the Ryukyu Islands. She must also be
concerned with the security of her trade route
to Southeast Asia and Western Europe. Up to
90 percent of all Japanese oil imports must
pass through the strategic Straits of Malacca.
It is rumored that Thailand, with support
from Japan, may build an oil pipeline across
the Isthmus of Kra. This would mutually
benefit both nations. Japan's oil route to the
Middle East would be reduced by
approximately 950 kilometers. Malaysia and
Indonesia have expressed their desire to
regulate shipping in the Malaccan Straits.
Since the end of World War I I Japan has
largely achieved the goals of its Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by astute
economic planning and aggressive execution.
Raw materials from Southeast Asia are being
funneled into homeland factories. This must
be the first time in history that a nation has
become so powerful economically, but not
militarily. Japan's World War I I experiences
have been a powerful constraint to
rearmament. We are faced with an ironical
situation. Japan has "won" World War I I

President Nixon announced his trip to Peking
without first consulting Japan. In this
situation Japan believed that her vital
interests were at stake and that America
should have consulted Tokyo. Premier Eisaku
Sato offered a mild reflection of Japanese
feelings during an interview with David
K e n n e d y , President Nixon's roving
ambassador for economic affairs. "The
measure taken by the United States at this
time runs counter to Oriental logic. It is
natural that secrecy be kept in diplomacy.
But the United States should have contacted
Japan much earlier, since we have always
emphasized strong friendship with the United
States."5
There is a growing youth movement in
Japan. Babies born after World War I I in 1945
will soon be thirty years old. There is a
reduced sense of shame about Japanese
aggressions in the war, largely because the
majority of the public feels itself to have been
uninvolved and therefore not responsible for
those actions. A resurgence of national pride
is taking place. It is a distinct possibility that
this self-assertiveness could be fueled by
differences with the United States and cause
Japan to increase its activities in the political
and military spheres.
Japan has been spending approximately
one percent of its Gross National Product
(GNP) on national defense. It is now a
ranking Free World military power, and
stands about seventh, worldwide. This is
rather high considering that the Japanese
constitution renounces war as an instrument
of policy. However, Japan's military posture
is constrained by strong political pressure to
remain defensive in nature. On one hand,
Japan can see the widespread withdrawal of
American military forces from Asia; on the
other, the growing nuclear capability of the
PRC. Can Japan count on the American
nuclear shield? Is it still a credible deterrent?
Would the United States be willing to incur
the risk of a Soviet or Chinese missile attack
on one of her own cities in order to protect
Japan? The Japanese have not forgotten
Hiroshima, but no longer refuse to discuss
nuclear weapons and defense. Some
inducements for Japan to "go nuclear" are
28

of the responsibility upon itself. It could also
divorce itself from US influence and pursue a
more neutral course along with a friendlier
relationship with Mainland China. I t is likely
that Japan will follow a more independent
course in the decade of the 70's. Whatever
actions Japan takes will be determined by its
own domestic policies and national interest.
These may not conform to our own desires.

thirty some years later by changing its
means-substituting economic power for
military.
Japan's future demand for raw materials
seems bound to grow, Japan might aid Russia
in developing Siberia. So far, interest has been
shown by both parties. Japan could use the
wood, iron, coal, and natural gas of the region
and the Soviet Union would be pleased to
receive the development capital of the
Japanese. The Soviet Union has a strong
bargaining point in reserve. For an
appropriate Japanese response, the Russians
could offer a World War I I peace treaty and
reversion of the Kurile Islands to Japanese
control.
There are also some compelling attractions
for closer Japanese ties with the People's
Republic of China. The growing Chinese
nuclear capability often mentioned in the
United States is not perceived as a direct and
present threat by the Japanese. There is a
racial and cultural affinity between these two
peoples. Is it possible that the centuries-old
myth of the "China market" may become a
reality? Japan has technological know-how,
capital, and the desire to expand. China has
the huge population, cheap labor, space, and
is making attempts to raise the workers'
standard of living. The China market may
develop as Japan aids China on her path to
modernization. In Japan, Tanaka has replaced
Sato and is making overtures to Peking to
include hints of early diplomatic recognition.
Japan is conducting increasing trade with
Southeast Asia. What is only a possible future
relationship with China is now a reality with
the Southeast Asian States. Once again, raw
materials, cheap labor, and space for industry
are the attractions for the Japanese. Japan has
contributed significantly in foreign aid in this
region, and has helped to subsidize the Asian
Development Bank. Very likely their aid is
primarily aimed at increasing the prospects
for better business.
There are several courses of action that
Japan could take relevant to its own security
in the Pacific. It could opt for "more of the
same"-a close relationship with the United
States which provides protection. It could
modify the defense arrangement taking more

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

On 25 October 197 1, the People's Republic
of China was voted into the United Nations in
place of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.
After years of unrest and disruption caused
by the Cultural Revolution, Mainland China
has in 197 1 resumed the initiative in
international diplomacy. The invitation to the
US ping-pong team to play a series of friendly
matches in China was the first outward sign of
a major change in the US/China dialogue.
Shortly thereafter President Nixon announced
his plans to visit Peking. The PRC is seeking
better relations with the United States for
several good reasons. She sees Soviet divisions
facing her along the 4,500-mile border with
Russia to the north. There is the danger of a
revival of Japanese militarism. Finally, with a
retrenchment of US military forces in Asia,
China realizes that the United States is
becoming less of a threat to her security. It is
certainly in the best interests of the PRC to
help the United States retrench in Asia. A
Chinese military maxim advises, "Do not
thwart an enemy returning home."6
What will be the results of President
Nixon's historic trip to Peking? What does
China hope to get out of the exchange? She
has gained prestige by having the leader of the
West's most powerful nation travel to her
capital. The visit could be used to drive a
wedge between the United States and Japan.
The United States may prove useful in
influencing the Soviet Union to refrain from
attacking China. The United States could
dissuade Japan from becoming a nuclear
power. Finally, the United States might be
persuaded to go along with a "Chinese
solution" to the problem of Taiwan. Many
other demands against the United States
29

to break down the nuclear monopoly, to
break down the threat of blackmail. We
have made it clear that we carry out a
limited number of nuclear tests, we
conduct them at a time when the wind
blows the radioactive dust first over our
populated areas before it goes to other
countries. What is more we make it clear
that the People's Republic of China will
never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

could have been made including complete
American military withdrawal from Taiwan,
the setting of a firm date for withdrawal of all
American troops from Vietnam, and the
removal of all military bases, nuclear missile
submarines, and aircraft carriers from Asia.7
What could the Chinese have offered in
return? Perhaps a promise not to seek a
military solution t o Taiwan. China might have
been persuaded to refrain from supporting the
major North Vietnamese offensive aimed at
sabotaging President Nixon's Vietnamization
plans.
Premier Chou En-lai has discussed China's
growing nuclear strength with representatives
of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation:

Chou went on to say that his country's first
interest was to develop industrially, but that
China "will absolutely not become a super
power."8
The Sino-Soviet split is likely t o last a long
time. The common border has produced
m a n y c h r o n i c problems. China views
Mongolia as a Russian puppet. There is also

You may ask, why does China want to
produce nuclear weapons? We'll do that

President Nixon shown with Chairman Mao Tse-TunG during the President's February 1972 visit to Peking.
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President Nixon shown in the Kremlin shaking hands with President Podgorny after the SALT I signing ceremony
during his summit visit to Moscow in May 1972.

ideological competition. Moscow has charged
t h a t Mao h a s abandoned Communist
principles and is aiming at world domination.
China was upset when she perceived
Brezhnev's proposal to sponsor an Asian
collective security pact as a deliberate attempt
at encircling and isolating her. However, since
the border crisis of 1969, there has been a
general easing of Sino-Soviet tensions, except
for verbal battles in the UN General
Assembly. This trend will permit the Chinese
t o expend more energy in seeking to extend
her influence into Southeast and Northeast
Asia.
What will be the outcome of the Taiwan
problem? Taiwan has been an important ally
of the United States. In 1970 US exports to
Taiwan totaled $463 million; US imports
from Taiwan were $579 million.9 What will
happen to this trade if the PRC takes over
control of Taiwan? How will that affect the
growing Japan/Taiwan trade? International
sanction has been given to claims of "both

Chinas" that there is only one China. A single
government, and that now in Peking,
represents the Chinese people in the United
Nations. There will eventually be a Chinese
solution, but it will take time. On the other
hand, the Taipei Government might proclaim
that it would henceforth conduct her affairs
as an independent country, increasing the
prospect of tension as Peking sought to gain
control of Taiwan. Chiao Kuan-Hua, Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, and
many other PRC leaders have threatened that
"No force on earth can stop us" from
liberating Taiwan and returning it to the fold
o f " t h e motherland." l0 The Chinese
Nationalists will no doubt make strong efforts
intended to help reverse the adverse political
trends set in motion by Taiwan's expulsion
from the United Nations. The governmental
reform conducted during the past 20 years
will be continued and extended. More
emphasis will be placed on youth, and the
programs of recent years of bringing
31

Taiwanese i n t o positions of greater
responsibility will no doubt be extended.11
This may prove successful in coping with
growing nationalistic feelings among
Taiwanese who desire more
self-determination.

beginning of a new era of improved ties
between Japan and the Soviet Union. The
Russians see both Japan and the United States
moving towards a detente with China, and
may perceive advantages in normalizing
relations with Japan.

USSR

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Soviet Union is now recognized as one
of the world's mightiest nations in terms of
military strength. In recent years she has
increased her naval presence in the
Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.
But the USSR faces a dilemma in the Pacific.
She wants to increase her influence in the
non- Communist states, and sees an
opportunity to do so in the light of US troop
withdrawals. However, the US departure also
opens the door to greater influence of the
People's Republic of China. Russia is certainly
concerned about her border with China.
Frequent border clashes have revived fears of
Chinese irredentism.
In June of 1969, Leonid Brezhnev, First
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party,
startled Asian nations by announcing, "We are
of the opinion that the course of events is
putting on the agenda the task of creating a
system of collective security in Asia." 1 2 This
was widely interpreted as a Soviet effort to
increase her sphere of influence and to
contain China. It is likely that the Soviet
Union will increase her trade and perhaps her
aid to Southeast Asia, but that any attempts
to sponsor an Asian association will be
unsuccessful.
The USSR and Japan have established a
joint economic committee which is delving
into the possibility of developing Siberia. This
attempt so far has not met with substantive
success. However, the potential exists. The
Russians could offer the Kurile Islands in
return for significant Japanese investment in
Siberia.
The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei
Gromyko, has concluded an agreement with
Japan to initiate negotiations for a treaty of
peace and the reciprocal exchange of visits by
the heads of government of the two nations
during the coming year. This could signify the

In our discussions of the major actors that
are playing on the Pacific stage, we must not
overlook the smaller Southeast Asia states.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m ASEAN ( t h e
Association of Southeast Asian Nations) have
declared that they will seek to neutralize
Southeast Asia. Foreign ministers from
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, special
envoy Thanat Khoman of Thailand, and
Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak
have signed a declaration of peace, freedom,
and neutrality. This is aimed at guaranteeing
noninterference in internal affairs by big
powers, and giving the Southeast Asian region
time to adjust to a changing balance of forces.
Prime Minister Razak stated that South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos also support
neutrality.13 Throughout the past two
decades there have been numerous attempts
at varying forms of regionalism. Now seems to
be the most propitious time for its further
development. The Five-Power Arrangement
for the defense of Malaysia and Singapore is a
welcome addition to the scene. Contributing
n a t i o n s include the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand.
Two regional political organizations are
showing promise. The Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC) provides a forum for the
consideration of Asian problems and includes
Japan and South Korea. This grouping may
provide Japan with her best opportunity to
increase her influence in the political sphere.
The Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN) may be more successful in
promoting regional cooperation than previous
abortive efforts. She has taken a step towards
i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade by approving the
f o r m a t i o n of a Special Coordinating
Committee of ASEAN (SSCAN) to negotiate
with the European Economic Community
(EEC). Both Cambodia and South Vietnam
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sent observers to the ASEAN ministerial
meeting in Singapore during April 1972, and
have expressed interest in joining the regional
o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e Philippines' Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Jose Ingles, has said that the Philippines will
propose military cooperation among member
countries of ASEAN for regional security.
The Vietnam War has given a boost to the
economies of several developing states.
Leadership elites have matured, Armed Forces
have improved, and industrialization has
spread. The smaller nations, having been given
more time by the US involvement in
Indochina, are far more capable of protecting
their own interests than they were fifteen
years ago. However, we should not be overly
sanguine concerning future prospects. The US
withdrawal of its combat ground forces from
South Vietnam still leaves a full-fledged war
raging in Indochina. Evidence that suggests
c o n t i n u e d fighting is the Indochina
Conference hosted by Chou En-lai in South
China during April of 1970. Communist
leaders from the two Vietnams, Laos,
Cambodia, and Peking pledged support for
the deposed Sihanouk's attempts to return to
power in Cambodia. Thousands of North
Vietnamese regulars are operating in Laos and
Cambodia. The PRC is building a road in
northern Laos that is aimed at Thailand's
border. China continues to support the wars
of national liberation in Thailand and Burma.
Domestic turmoil causes dissension within
several struggling governments. But, in large
measure, they will have to make it on their
own. The Nixon Doctrine is clear-in most
cases we will provide the materiel support
while Asians supply the manpower, and then
only in carefully selected situations. However,
the President has emphasized on many
occasions that under the Nixon Doctrine we
will stand by our allies, and in cases involving
other types of aggression than nuclear attacks
against an ally, when we provide the nuclear
shield, we shall furnish military and economic
assistance when requested in accordance with
our treaty commitments. Congress will play a
more important part in American foreign
policy in the future. The days of Tonkin Gulf
Resolutions, giving the executive a carte
blanche in an undeclared war, are over.

China will undoubtedly become more
influential in Southeast Asia. Throughout
history she has often had a special
relationship with her neighbors. China would
like a string of friendly buffer states around
her borders, without the presence of
American military bases. Southeast Asian
nations recognize the emergence of the PRC
on the world stage, and the lowered profile of
the United States in the Pacific. There is a
Thai proverb that is most applicable: "When
the wind blows, the bamboo bends." The
wind has shifted out of China, and is being
felt by the smaller powers. The UN vote to
admit Mainland China in place of the
Nationalist regime is indicative of things to
come. The Albanian resolution was supported
by Burma, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Indonesia and Thailand abstained. The only
Pacific nations To vote against the resolution
were Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Cambodia, and the Philippines.
CHANGING POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Stepping back from the inspection of
individual nations or power centers, let us
take a look at the "big picture" in the Pacific.
We see coming into play four of the top five
powers in the world. A new multipolar
structure is unfolding including the Big Four
and the smaller Asian states. The actors on
the international scene are both more potent
and energetic, while their numbers are
increasing. The growth of pluralism and the
dynamic relationship between nations will
require sophisticated and timely methods of
handling future problems.
The administration of Premier Sato in
Japan consistently followed the lead of US
policy regarding Mainland China and Taiwan.
Chinese leaders were emphatic in their
declarations that they did not want a
rapprochement with Japan until Sato left the
scene. Upon announcing his resignation,
Premier Sato urged that Japan continue her
close association with the United States, while
trying to improve relations with the PRC. It is
likely that Japan will decide to continue her
policy of concentrating on economic activity
while enjoying the protection provided by the
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depletion of natural resources, the United
States needs both the raw materials and the
markets of the Pacific. To promote a peaceful
and prosperous Asia, we must share in the
maintenance of an equilibrium of power in
the Pacific. It is also opportune that we
change our relationship with Mainland China.
We should offer to the PRC a phased program
of increasing contacts and exchanges.
Hopefully, the Nixon visit will point the way
to peaceful progress.
There is no foreseeable clash of vital
interests in the Pacific between the Soviet
Union and the United States, although the
Russians would be concerned if they saw the
United States and China becoming too
friendly. We should continue attempting to
reach agreements in our strategic arms
limitation talks, and mutual and balanced
force reductions in Europe. We should not in
any way attempt to intensify or escalate the
Sino-Soviet split, although it is generally
beneficial to us. A war between these two
powers would only spread havoc. As the
Laotians say, "When the elephants fight, the
ants get trampled."
The United States ought to make a clear
affirmation of the nuclear shield principle
while advocating that Japan build up her
conventional forces. A nuclear-armed Japan
would cause disruption in the Pacific.
Concurrently, we should seek a mutual
resolution of our economic problems.
With respect to the Pacific as a whole, the
United States should attempt to increase her
trade. We need to originate a new and
"saleable" foreign aid program that would be
channeled primarily through multilateral
organizations, like the Asian Development
Bank. We should support Asian attempts at
regionalism by cooperating to accelerate
economic growth, social progress, and cultural
development of the area. Several Pacific allies
will require continued military support for
some time into the future. This includes
S o u t h Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand. The Republic of Korea will soon be
able to take care of herself and the threat
posed by North Korea may be diminishing.
We should not rigidly stand by all our prior
commitments. It is necessary to realize that

United States. The Self-Defense Forces will
probably be modernized and increased in size.
It is unlikely that Japan will decide to acquire
nuclear weapons unless she perceives a real
threat-from either China or the Soviet
Union-and becomes doubtful concerning the
credibility of the US nuclear shield.
The People's Republic of China may
possibly have chosen the role of a stable
world power rather than the chief proponent
of world revolution. After the Cultural
Revolution she has embarked on a diplomatic
offensive. Peking has been friendlier to
western governments, especially those in the
Third World. The seating of the PRC in the
United Nations may have crowned China as
the international leader of the Third World. If
China is not completely successful in
reestablishing her hegemony in Southeast
Asia, she will at least have a revised and
expanded sphere of influence. There will be
continued Sino-Soviet tensions. The rift
between these two nations could conceivably
be closed by Japanese acquisition of nuclear
weapons, a fact that the Japanese recognize.
Finally, it is certainly within the best interests
of the PRC to establish friendlier relations
with the United States. Military retrenchment
by the United States in Asia, one facet of the
Nixon Doctrine, has opened the door to a
new era of Sino-American relations. However,
Taiwan remains China's most challenging
foreign policy problem with respect to Japan
and the United States.
In the Pacific at the present time we see
m o r e n u m e r o u s and m o r e forceful
international powers. There will be attempts
by several to fill the vacuum created by the
US withdrawal of troops, and significant
withdrawal of American interest in Asia.
These nations now seem to be jockeying for
position. We may be witnessing a preliminary
period of "making friends and influencing
people."
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States cannot turn its back on
Asia on the grounds that her only real
interests lie in Europe. In a world of
e x p a n d i n g population, and continuous
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we are going through a period in our history
when our national interests are being
examined and national priorities are being
rearranged. Commitments in the past have
been shaped by our national interests. It
should logically follow that our commitments
must also change as our interests change.

a matter of professional pride that a soldier
will attempt to accomplish any mission with
whatever resources are made available and in
spite of all difficulties and hardships. But
what is regarded as a virtue at the lower unit
level can be a vice at the highest levels. When
the President requests counsel in a crisis
situation, military leaders must examine the
political constraints which may be entailed.
All the difficulties and risks involved in
security operations with severe political
constraints should be clearly pointed out to
the civilian leadership. The "system" may
make this a ticklish undertaking. It is possible
that a President, when confronted with a
military recommendation that urges restraint,
may turn to more adventurous and ambitious
men who are figuratively raising their hands
and shouting, ''Hell, sir, let me try. I can d o
it!" Integrity, loyalty, and professionalism of
the highest order must be instilled in our
military leaders and those who advise them.
The old hard line advocating military action
against Communist Bloc aggressions anywhere
and anytime, along with unqualified support
for allied governments experiencing internal
upheavals, is no longer acceptable. It should
be replaced by recommendations taking into
consideration the motivations and interests of
other nations in the multipolar international
scene and the "art of the possible" at home.
Today in America we face a new danger.
The isolationist sentiment is growing stronger,
especially with respect to Asia. While lowering
our profile in the Pacific, we are decreasing
o u r expenditures for foreign aid and
questioning our support of the United
Nations at home. The lessons of Vietnam
should not be applied to situations in which
they are not relevant. It is essential that we
preserve an American balancing presence in
Asia, emphasizing political and diplomatic
means while maintaining a credible military
capability. President Johnson has warned us
that "No single nation can or should be
permitted to dominate the Pacific region."14
We must have the wisdom to understand the
new power relationships now developing in
Asia. We must also have the will to employ all
the elements of national power in maintaining
peace in the Pacific.

LESSONS LEARNED

While studying the new power relationships
in the Pacific and their future consequences,
it would serve us well to deliberate on lessons
learned in recent years. Our Nation has been
torn apart by the Vietnam experience. For all
our altruistic and ideological reasons for
involvement, the cost became far too great-in
manpower, money, and national cohesion.
Nevertheless, we should wait and let history
be the final judge. Upon reflection in less
troubled and emotional times, it may be
decided that American endeavors were in fact
worthwhile. Priceless time was gained for
developing n a t i o n s , economies were
strengthened, and leadership elites matured.
Private pronouncements from most Asian
leaders express the view that the US presence
was highly desirable and proved to be the
counterbalance to Communist China's
support for wars of national liberation.
Hopefully we will have learned some
lessons from the Vietnam War. Security
commitments should be extended only where
our vital national interests are at stake.
Careful analysis must be made of a
government's viability before the decision is
made to support it. We should not become
too attached to any one national leader. We
need to relearn the lessons previously taught
in World War I I and Korea that air and sea
power alone can neither stop infiltration or
enemy personnel and movement of supplies,
nor destroy the will of an enemy to fight. Our
political leaders ought to realize that military
operations must be fully explained to the
American people and Congress in order to
gain their wholehearted support.
The quality of military advice given to our
civilian leaders should be improved. We have
to guard against the "Can Do" synrome. It is
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